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JUDICIAL MAELSTROM IN FEDERAL WATERS: A
COMPOSITE INTERPRETATION OF THE
FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972
I. INTRODUCTION
Early explorers of the vast reaches of the Western Hemisphere were quick
to take notice of the beauty of North America's waterways.' Verrazano,
perhaps the first European to visit these shores, wrote: " '[V]e found a very
pleasant situation among some steep hills, through which a very large river,
deep at its mouth, forced its way to the sea .... We passed up this river,
about half a league, when we found it formed a most beautiful lake three
leagues in circuit . . .. [T]his region . . . seemed so commodious and
delightful .... " -2 Three centuries later, these same waters (New York Bay)3
prompted a tragically accurate comment from Senator Robert Kennedy, who
said: " 'If you fall in here you don't drown-you decay.' "4 Such commentary
is not unusual, for the state of the nation's waters by the mid-1960's was
shocking. Lake Erie had literally developed the consistency and appearance of
pea soup,5 becoming, in effect, a "huge . . . cesspool," 6 while the waters of
such great rivers as the Hudson had become dangerously disease-ridden. 7 The
cause of the problem-pollution-can be simply described;8 its solution, on
the other hand, has proven to be a matter of incredible complexity.
Against a background of enormous frustration 9 Congress passed the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (the Act),' 0 a sweeping
piece of legislation that has as its goal the final, absolute cessation of harmful
1. An early colonist, for example, referred to the Potomac River as "'the sweetest and
greatest river I have seene.' " Bird, Our Dying Waters, Saturday Evening Post, April 23, 1966,
reprinted in C. Myers, The Environmental Crisis: Will We Survive? 27 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Myers].
2. R. Boyle, The Hudson River- A Natural and Unnatural History 29 (1969).
3. See id.: "The first European to discover the Hudson River, or at least New York Harbor,
was .. .Verrazano . . . ."; Myers, supra note 1, at 28.
4. Myers, supra note 1, at 28.
5. Commoner, Balance of Nature, in Providing Quality Environment in Our Communities
(W. Konkle ed. 1968), reprinted in Water Pollution, A Scientists' Institute for Public Information
Workbook 17 (G. Berg ed. 1970).
6. Id. at 18.
7. In 1965, a watermelon found floating in the Hudson was determined to be the cause of
eight cases of typhoid fever contracted by those who had later eaten it. Myers, supra note 1, at
28.
8. For a good general discussion of the causes of water pollution, see Water Pollution, A
Scientists' Institute for Public Information Workbook (G. Berg ed. 1970).
9. Davis & Glasser, The Discharge Permit Program Under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1972-Improvement of Water Quality Through the Regulation of Discharges from
Industrial Facilities, 2 Fordham Urb. L.J. 179, 192-95 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Davis]; see note
74 infra.
10. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.
(Supp. V, 1975) [hereinafter cited as the Act].
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water pollution by 1985. 11 The strength of congressional determination toward
this end can be seen in both the language of the Act itself 12 and its history, 13
and is perhaps typified by the remarks of Senator Edmund Muskie, a prime
mover in the enactment of the legislation, made in connection with the Act's
declaration of goals and policy: 14 "These are not merely the pious declarations
that Congress so often makes in passing its laws; on the contrary, this is
literally a life or death proposition for the Nation." Is
The heart of the Act, the imposition of technology related 16 and water-
quality related' 7 effluent discharge limitations upon those who use our
waterways as some "vast, rancid sewer,"' 8 is founded upon a proposition that
in its simplicity approaches a tautology-if no one pollutes, there will be no
pollution. Realistically, however, the application of these standards has
proven to be an "administrative nightmare."' 19 The sheer variety and number
of water polluters throughout the country are indicative of the problems
which have impeded the Act's implementation. 20 Unfortunately, the night-
mare has not been exclusively administrative.
11. "The objective of this [Act] is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation's waters. In order to achieve this objective it is hereby declared
that, consistent with the provisions of this [Act]-(1) it is the national goal that the discharge of
pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985 . . " The Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. §
1251(a) (Supp. V, 1975).
12. Id.
13. The Act itself is a compromise bill, designed by a conference committee of both houses of
Congress. Staff of Senate Comm. on Public Works, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., A Legislative History of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 282 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as History].
Each house, prior to the compromise bill, had passed its own version by overwhelming
margins. S. 2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), in History, supra at 1534; H.R. 11896, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1972), in History, supra at 893. The House bill passed by a vote of 366 to 11, and the
Senate bill passed by 74 to 0. History, supra at 141.
Furthermore, the Act itself was passed over a presidential veto. The House vote to override the
veto was 247 to 23. 118 Cong. Rec. 37,060-61 (1972). The Senate vote to defeat the veto was 32 to
12. Id. at 36,879.
14. The Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(Supp. V, 1975).
15. History, supra note 13, at 164.
16. The Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. V, 1975).
17. The Act § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (Supp. V, 1975).
18. History, supra note 13, at 862 (remarks of Reps. B. Abzug and C. Rangel).
19. "Development of effluent limitations guidelines and standards of performance has proven
to be an administrative nightmare .... Davis, supra note 9, at 215; Comment, The Application
of Effluent Limitations and Effluent Guidelines to Industrial Polluters: An Administrative
Nightmare, 13 Houston L. Rev. 348 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Houston].
20. The Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. V, 1975), provides for a national pollutant
discharge elimination system (NPDES) which requires point sources (that is, individual plants
discharging within a limited spatial zone) discharging pollutants into the nation's waters to obtain
discharge permits. As of December 31, 1974, the total number of permits issued (industrial and
municipal) was 27,925. [19751 Envir. Rep. (BNA) 41:2204 (1975). Six months later, by July 1,
1975, the number of issued permits had substantially increased to 40,291. The Sixth Annual
Report of the Council on Environmental Quality 65 (1975). For a more complete discussion of the
Act, see Davis, supra note 9.
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The framers of the Act had hoped to eliminate fundamental interpretive
problems from the beginning, "not [by leaving] the final evaluation of the bill
to legislative history, but instead [by writing] into law as clearly as possible
the intent of the Congress. '21 The courts' reactions, on the other hand, have
not justified the initial optimism. A survey of the many recent circuit court
decisions involving the Act's interpretation highlights the rampant judicial
confusion. The Fourth Circuit has found the Act to be "vague, uncertain, and
inconsistent '22 while the Third Circuit stated that "[t]he failure to provide a
clear procedural structure . . . in the administration of the Act is disquiet-
ing. '23 The Second Circuit considered the "statutory language [to be] devoid
of plain meaning," 24 and concluded that "[i]t would be too much to say that
we construe this confusing statute with confidence. ' 25 The Tenth Circuit
recently emphasized that "[tihe Act is difficult to understand, construe, and
apply. ' 26 Obviously, this judicial reaction strongly conflicts with Senator
Muskie's opening enthusiasm concerning the Act's efficacy and clarity.27
The origins and present state of the controversy will be the primary focus of
this Note. An explanation of the background and internal structure of the Act
itself is necessary before any in-depth study can be made, but as this has been
thoroughly explored elsewhere, 28 an attempt has been made to abbreviate,
where possible, the discussion of the statutory material. This Note will
concentrate instead upon the Act from a judicial perspective in an effort to
determine what the courts see as the major stumbling blocks in the Act's
application.
II. THE ACT
The focus of the present Act is on "effluent limitations" while the criterion
of water-quality, the keystone of the previous inefficient legislation,2 9 has
been retained as a measure of program effectiveness and industrial perfor-
mance. 30 Given the Act's ultimate aim, "that the discharge of all pollutants
into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985,"31 the altered focus would
seem necessary.
Reduced to its essentials, the Act's mechanism is the establishment of a
shifting system of standards whereby the level of permissible discharge
(effluent limitation) becomes increasingly restrictive, arriving hopefully at a
21. History, supra note 13, at 164 (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
22. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, Nos. 74-1261 et al., at 14 (4th Cir., March 10,
1976), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3165 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Du Pont 1I].
23. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1074 (3d Cir. 1975).
24. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 627 (2d Cir. 1976).
25. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 538 F.2d 513, 518 (2d Cir. 1976).
26. American Petrol. Inst. v. EPA, Nos. 74-1465 et al., at 8 (10th Cir., Aug. 11, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as American Petrol. II].
27. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
28. See Davis, supra note 9; Houston, supra note 19.
29. See note 74 infra.
30. S. Rep. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1971) [hereinafter cited as S. Rep.).
31. See note 11 supra.
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zero-discharge condition by 1985.32 The most important sections for the
purpose of this Note are sections 301, 33 304,34 402, 35 and 509.36 These
sections deal with the implementation and enforcement of the effluent limita-
tion mechanism as it pertains to existing industrial point sources.
Section 301(a)37 provides that, with certain exceptions, 38 the discharge of
any pollutant shall be unlawful. The exceptions exist basically to alleviate the
degree of economic disruption which would necessarily have followed had this
section been implemented immediately. 39 Section 301(b)40 demands that by
July 1, 1977 existing industrial point sources of pollutants achieve that level of
discharge attainable through application of the "best practicable control
technology currently available as defined by ...section [304](b) ... ,,41 By
1983, however, classes or categories of point sources are required to achieve
that discharge reduction attainable through "application of the best available
technology economically achievable for such category or class, which will
result in reasonable further progress toward the national goal . . . in
accordance with regulations issued ... pursuant to section [304](b)(2) .... ,,42
This section further demands that where technologically and economically
feasible, a class or category of point sources shall be required entirely to
eliminate the discharge of pollutants. 43 The 1983 standards reflect a desire to
attain an interim goal, wherein a given water body's biological integrity
would be stabilized even though a zero-discharge condition may not have
been reached.44
Section 301(b) also states that "there shall be achieved . . . effluent
limitations. '45 This language has proven to be particularly troublesome, for it
is uncertain whether this is merely a statement of statutory intent or whether
it actually triggers the implementation of the effluent limitation mechanism. 4 6
32. The Act § I1l(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(c)(1) (Supp. V, 1975); S. Brubaker, In Command of
Tomorrow 122 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Brubaker].
33. The Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. V, 1975).
.34. The Act § 304, 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (Supp. V, 1975).
35. The Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. V, 1975).
36. The Act § 509, 33 U.S.C. § 1369 (Supp. V, 1975).
37. The Act § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (Supp. V, 1975).
38. The Act is basically one of control of discharge. Therefore, discharge is allowable but only
under the conditions defined by the Act. See notes 39-71 infra and accompanying text.
39. S. Rep., supra note 30, at 43.
40. The Act § 301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
41. The Act § 301(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (Supp. V, 1975).
42. The Act § 301(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (Supp. V, 1975).
43. Id.
44. The attainment of the interim goal is further aided by § 302 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1312
(Supp. V, 1975): if in particular bodies of water the effluent limitations imposed under § 301(b)(2),
33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2) (Supp. V, 1975), are found to actually impede the attainment of a certain
level of water quality, § 302(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (Supp. V, 1975), provides for the application
of more stringent standards. See S. Rep., supra note 30, at 46.
45. The Act § 301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
46. See notes 72 & 73 infra and accompanying text.
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Section 30447 provides for the accumulation of the vast amounts of informa-
tion necessary to determine the "degree of effluent reduction attainable
through the application of the best practicable control technology currently
available"48 and the "degree of effluent reduction attainable through the
application of the best control measures and practices achievable."49 In each
case the determination is two-tiered: identification of the amount and charac-
teristics of pollutants for each stage of effluent limitation," ° and specification
of the factors to be considered in defining the appropriate applicable technol-
ogy.5 1 The effectuating language of section 304 is, "the Administrator shall...
publish ... regulations, providing guidelines for effluent limitations .... ,,s2
This language, particularly the word "guidelines," underlies much of the
current debate in the courts.5 3
The effluent limitation program outlined above5 4 is given partial effect s$ by
section 402,56 which establishes a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES). Although all discharge is prohibited,"5 permits for such
discharge may be obtained by application to the Administrator of the EPA. If
the Administrator determines that the discharge complies fully with effluent
limitations established under the requirements of subchapter 111s of the Act,
a permit may be issued.5 9 Furthermore, this section allows and encourages
the ultimate take over of the permit issuance function by states whose permit
programs are determined to be in full compliance with the Act's discharge
47. The Act § 304, 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (Supp. V, 1975).
48. The Act § 304(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(A) (Supp. V, 1975) (emphasis added).
49. The Act § 304(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(A) (Supp. V, 1975) (emphasis added).
50. The Act 88 304(b)(1)(A), (2)(A), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314(b)(1)(A), (2)(A) (Supp. V, 1975).
51. "Factors relating to the assessment of best... technology... shall also take into account
the age of equipment and facilities involved, the process employed, the engineering aspects of the
application of various types of control techniques, process changes, non-water quality environ-
mental impact (including energy requirements), and such other factors as the Administrator
deems appropriate . . . ." The Act § 304(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (Supp. V, 1975); see
the Act § 304(b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B) (Supp. V, 1975).
52. The Act § 304(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (Supp. V, 1975) (emphasis added).
53. See note 75 infra.
54. New source standards, not being central to the controversy at hand, have not been
discussed in this Note. The effluent limitation requirements for new sources are governed by the
Act § 306, 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (Supp. V, 1975), and are virtually identical to those governing the
1983 interim goal for existing sources. Compare id. with the Act § 301(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C.
1311(b)(2)(A) (Supp. V, 1975).
55. The controversy revolves in part around the question of the degree to which different
sections of the Act are to be employed in the regulation of discharge. See, e.g., notes 214-25 infra
and accompanying text.
56. The Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. V, 1975).
57. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
58. That is, the requirements of the current applicable technology as established by § 304, 33
U.S.C. § 1314 (Supp. V, 1975). "Subchapter IM" includes all of this section plus those
requirements applicable to new sources, thermal discharges, toxic sources, and so forth. The Act,
Subchapter III-Standards and Enforcement, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-28 (Supp. V, 1975).
59. The Act § 402(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (Supp. V, 1975).
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restrictions. 60 The Administrator retains substantial discretion in granting6'
or withdrawing 62 approval of any state's permit program.
Section 509,63 which governs administrative procedure and judicial review,
is one of the more inflamed spots at the heart of the present controversy. This
section gives the circuit courts original jurisdiction to review only certain of
the EPA's actions under the Act. These include issuance of new source
standards, 64 issuance of toxic source standards, 65 determination of the valid-
ity of state permit programs 66 and the issuance or denial of permits by the
Administrator. 67 The particularly troublesome subsection is 509(b)(1)(E),
which provides for initial circuit court review of any Administrator's action
"in approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation
under section 301, 302, or 306 .... ,"68 It is immediately apparent that section
509(b)(1)(E) makes no mention whatever of section 304, the crucial section
under which the applicable technology is defined. The glaring omission of
section 304 from section 509(b)(1)(E) has set the scene for a judicial struggle
that has lasted for well over a year 69 and is likely to continue for at least that
long.
70
The question is two-fold. First, the passive voice of section 301(b), "there
shall be achieved . . . effluent limitations," 7 1 does not specify how, and by
whom, these effluent limitations will be achieved. It is clear that the limits of
section 301 "best practicable" and "best available" technologies are defined by
60. "At any time after the promulgation of the guidelines . . . the Governor of each State
desiring to administer its own permit program for discharges into navigable waters within its
jurisdiction may submit to the Administration a full and complete description of the program It
proposes to establish and administer . . . . The Administrator shall approve each submitted
program unless he determines that adequate authority does not exist: (1) To issue permits
which--(A) apply, and insure compliance with, any applicable requirements of sections 1311,
1312, 1316, 1317, and 1343 of this title . The Act § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (Supp. V,
1975).
61. Id.
62. The Act § 402(c)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (Supp. V, 1975).
63. The Act § 509, 33 U.S.C. § 1369 (Supp. V, 1975).
64. The Act § 509(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1369 (b)(1)(A) (Supp. V, 1975).
65. The Act § 509(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(C) (Supp. V, 1975).
66. The Act § 509(b)(1)(D), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(D) (Supp. V, 1975).
67. The Act § 509(b)(1)(F), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F) (Supp. V, 1975).
68. The Act § 509(b)(1)(E), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(E) (Supp. V, 1975).
69. The first case to squarely face this problem was CPC Int'l Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032
(8th Cir. 1975). Since this decision on May 5, 1975, thirteen circuit court cases have dealt with the
same or similar issues. See American Petrol. II, supra note 26, at 6-7. In the interim, the Eighth
Circuit has acknowledged and reaffirmed the existence of the controversy. CPC Int'l Inc. v.
Train, No. 74-1448, at 1-3 n.1 (8th Cir., Aug. 18, 1976) [hereinafter cited as CPC II].
70. Two cases from the Fourth Circuit are now pending before the Supreme Court. Du Pont
II, supra note 22; E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 528 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1975), cert.
granted, 96 S. Ct. 1662 (1976). However, the cases are docketed for the 1976-77 session, and final
determination will take some time. 45 U.S.L.W. 3040-41, Nos. 75-978, 75-1473 (U.S. July 27,
1976).
71. The Act § 301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
[Vol. 45
1976] WATER POLLUTION
section 304 "guidelines,"7 2 but whether or not section 301 gives the Adminis-
trator authority to regulate actual discharge by promulgation of section 304
guidelines is by no means certain. Second, if the Administrator can issue
"regulations" under the guise of section 304, is initial review thereof available
in circuit or district courts? The tension between sections 301 and 304, created
by the ambiguity of section 509, has threatened the Act's efficacy by promot-
ing an unnecessary amount of litigation, 73 the inefficiency of which is reminis-
cent of that experienced with the pre-1972 programs. 74
III. THE CONTROVERSY
The majority of the cases present similar factual situations. The EPA had
issued a series of "regulations"75 that were to be applied to various industrial
72. Notes 41 & 42 supra and accompanying text.
73. See note 69 supra.
74. Legislative and public concern with pollution of the nation's lakes, rivers, and bordering
seas is not a recent fad. Prior to enactment of the present law in 1972 there had been no fewer
than thirteen congressional attempts, dating back nearly a quarter of a century, to arrive at a
workable scheme for the prevention, control, and abatement of water pollution. 33 U.S.C. § 12S 1
(Supp. V, 1975) (listing the thirteen acts and amendments in the area of water pollution control
since the first act in 1948). Starting in 1948, federal legislation in the field had been severely
limited by an overriding principle of public policy: the states, it was felt, should spearhead the
national attack on pollution. S. Rep., supra note 30, at 1. Consequently, the federal role had been
confined to one of mere support and assistance (e.g., support of research projects, limited
financial aid to treatment plants, etc.). S. Rep., supra note 30, at 1-2. And, though by 1965 the
federal role had been radically upgraded, id. at 2 (the 1965 legislation gave a newly created
federal agency a large role in the development and application of states' water quality standards,
see Act of Oct. 2, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903), the continued reliance upon state
initiative had led only to overwhelming inefficiency. The level of expertise concerning the nature
of dischargers, the quantity and quality of pollutants and available abatement procedures, etc.,
was minimal. Existing research programs and sewage treatment plant funding were inadequate.
Worst of all, violations of the few existing statutory provisions went virtually unprosecuted. S.
Rep., supra note 30, at 4-7. Estimates range from one to two prosecutions since 1948. Id. at 5;
Houston, supra note 19, at 349-50 & n.13. In any case, with so small a chance of penalty, there is
little wonder that "foot-dragging [was] a rational response for polluters." Brubaker, supra note
32, at 121.
The entire spectrum of inadequacies inherent in the pre-1972 legislative programs can be traced
to their misplaced reliance upon curative, rather than preventive, measures. The 1965 legislation
attempted to provide for definitive water quality standards by taking into account various
considerations of ecology, esthetics, and public health. Act of Oct. 2, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, §
5(c)(3), 79 Stat. 908 ("Standards of quality established ... shall be such as to protect the public
health [and] enhance the public health or welfare ... and shall take into consideration [the] use
and value [of] public water supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife [and] recreational . . . and
other legitimate uses [of water standards].'). The fact also remained that enforcement proceedings
could not be initiated until it was too late. Legal action could be brought only after the discharge
of pollutants had caused the water quality to fall below the established standards which were
themselves expressions of absolutely minimal levels of water quality. Act of Oct. 2, 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-234, § 5(c)(5), 79 Stat. 909. See S. Rep., supra note 30, at 4-5. The water quality
standards had established "the maximum levels of pollution allowable." Id. at 4. Put another
way, these standards had established the poorest acceptable water. The statutory enforcement
procedure was thus doomed to failure before it was ever begun.
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categories and subcategories. 76 These regulations were claimed by the EPA to
include both effluent limitations, established pursuant to section 301, and
guidelines, established pursuant to section 304.77 Thus, for every industrial
category the applicable regulations include two elements: (1) a statement of
A further complication in the enforcement of water quality standards was the time-consuming
and convoluted nature of the enforcement procedure itself. Any abatement action began with an
enforcement conference being called by the state or the EPA. The conference would then advise
the EPA Administrator who could, after issuing preliminary recommendations, convene a hearing
board to produce final recommendations. Brubaker, supra note 32, at 121. Then a suit was
brought, wherein the court was required to review everything which had gone before, plus any
"additional evidence . .. necessary to a complete review of the standards and . .. alleged
violation." Act of Oct. 2, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, § 5(c)(5), 79 Stat. 909. The conference
procedure alone, prior to the trial, required a minimum of a year to complete. Brubaker, supra
note 32, at 121.
Enforcement was also complicated by another aspect of reliance upon water quality standards.
If one assumes, for example, that the water quality of a certain body of water has become
unacceptable due to the discharge from a number of industrial sources, a successful action could
be maintained only by crossing what one court has termed "a virtually unbridgeable causal gap
. ." CPC Int'l Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1035 (8th Cir. 1975). Linking the discharge from a
single source to the below-quality water under these circumstances was nearly impossible.
Finally, the water quality standards themselves could not be translated into reliable effluent
limitations for a given body of water due to the imprecision of the models for water quality and
the variable effect of different effluents in different waters. S. Rep., supra note 30, at 8. For
example, by changing a single variable, temperature, a water body's assimilative capacity can be
altered. Further, water temperature is itself affected by many factors: rainfall, flow velocity,
idiosyncratic climatic conditions, etc. See Davis, supra note 9, at 200. Stated simply, while
enforcement was aimed at single measures, no single measure was reflective of water quality.
Brubaker, supra note 32, at 120.
75. The word "regulation" is put in quotations for a particular reason: the controversy itself is
centered on whether the materials put out by the EPA were promulgated effluent limitation
regulations, or published effluent limitation guidelines. Thus, to name the EPA materials as
either guidelines or regulations is itself a solution of the problem. See Hooker Chems. & Plastics
Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 626 (2d Cir. 1976). However, for ease of usage the word regulation
will be used, with this warning in mind.
76. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 406.10-.16 (1976); note 80 infra. It should be recalled that
pursuant to § 304(b) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (Supp. V, 1975), the Administrator was
required to publish guidelines applicable to classes or categories of point sources. The guidelines
identified both the factors to be considered in determining the requisite technology (that of 1977
versus 1983) and the quantity and quality of specific proscribed pollutants. See notes 47-51 supra
and accompanying text. The result was volume 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations, a massive
compilation of industrial categories and regulations applicable thereto. It is interesting to note
that the original statutory deadline for these regulations, Oct. 18, 1973, the Act § 304(b), 33
U.S.C. § 1314(b) (Supp. V, 1975), was missed, and that the ultimate regulations resulted from a
court-imposed timetable. See National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692,
697-98 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
77. 40 C.F.R. § 401.12 (1976). The title of this section, "[law authorizing establishment of
effluent limitations guidelines for existing sources", id., alone is indicative of the combination of
99 301 and 304. One should take note particularly of the hybrid phrase "effluent limitations
guidelines" which appears nowhere in the Act itself. Compare the Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. 1311
(Supp. V, 1975) with the Act § 304, 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (Supp. V, 1975).
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the data used to arrive at the categorical limitations 8 and (2) a pronounce-
ment, in table form, of that quantity of discharge allowable (hence, effluent
limitations).79
The judicial actions arose from petitions to review these regulations"0 and,
since the arguments on both sides remain fairly consistent throughout, a
summary is appropriate. First, all parties, and the courts themselves, agreed
that circuit court review of new source regulations was not at issue;8' the
disputes centered instead on whether the circuit court could review the
existing source regulations. 8 2 A necessary corollary to the jurisdictional issue
was whether or not section 301 actually gave the EPA the authority to issue
effluent limitations as regulations in the first place.
8 3
The petitioners' views took the following form: the EPA entirely lacks the
power under section 301 to promulgate existing source effluent limitations by
regulation.8 4 Rather, the argument goes, effluent limitations are to be im-
posed on a plant-by-plant basis during the permit-granting stage.8s At this
point, and not before, section 304(b) guidelines are to be consulted.8 6 Since
the EPA lacks a separate regulatory power under section 301, the published
regulations were products of section 304.87 The conclusion follows that the
78. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 406.12(a) (1976); note 80 infra.
79. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 406.12(b) (1976); note 80 infra.
80. Chronologically, the major cases appeared as follows: CPC Int'l Inc. v. Train, S 15 F.2d
1032 (8th Cir. 1975) (Corn Wet Milling Subcategory of Grain Mills Point Source Category, 40
C.F.R. § 406.10-.16 (1975)); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975)
(Iron and Steel Manufacturing Point Source Category, 40 C.F.R. § 420 (1976)); American Meat
Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975) (Meat Products Point Source Category, 40 C.F.R. §
432 (1976)); Du Pont II, supra note 22 (Inorganic Chemicals 1anufacturing Point Source
Category, 40 C.F.R. § 415 (1976)); Hooker Chems. & Plastic Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620 (2d
Cir. 1976) (Phosphate Manufacturing Point Source Category, 40 C.F.R. § 422 (1976); American
Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Canned and Preserved Fruits and
Vegetables Processing Point Source Category, 40 C.F.R. § 407 (1976); American Petrol. 11. supra
note 26 (Petroleum Refining Point Source Category, 40 C.F.R. § 419 (1976)). There are other
cases, dealing with other industrial categories, but these are the major ones for the purposes here.
For a more complete listing, see American Petrol. II, supra note 26, at 6-7.
81. This follows from the explicit mention of § 306, 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (Supp. V, 1975) in §
509(b)(1)(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(e) (Supp. V, 1975). See CPC Int'l Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d
1032, 1034 (8th Cir. 1975). See also note 54 supra.
82. See, e.g., American Petrol. Inst. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1343, 1345 (10th Cir. 1975);
American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 448 (7th Cir. 1975); CPC Int'l Inc. v. Train, 515
F.2d 1032, 1037 (8th Cir. 1975).
83. See notes 71 & 72 supra and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 448-49 (7th Cir. 1975); American
Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1035 (3d Cir. 1975); CPC Int'l Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d
1032, 1037 (8th Cir. 1975).
85. See note 84 supra.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 626 (2d Cir. 1976);
American Petrol. Inst. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1343, 1345 (10th Cir. 1975); CPC Int'! Inc. v. Train,
515 F.2d 1032, 1037 (8th Cir. 1975).
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circuit courts lack jurisdiction to review the guidelines because section
509(b)(1)(E), judicial review, makes no mention of section 304.88
The petitioners' argument appears, therefore, to construe the power struc-
ture of subchapter I of the Act hierarchically. Section 301, the "base,"
becomes little more than a statement of general statutory intention, while the
"punch" of the statute is derived from the permit programs of section 402,
which partially incorporate the section 304 guidelines.
In EPA's view, the regulations were firmly based upon a section 301(b)
power to publish limitations. This power was derived from the phrase, "there
shall be achieved . . . effluent limitations.) 8 9
According to the EPA, the passive voice signalled congressional intent to
require the EPA to regulate discharge by promulgation of effluent limitations
under section 301(b). 90 The limitations so imposed would apply uniformly to
industrial categories as minimum standards which would "be mechanically
cranked into individual permits issued by the states or the EPA." 91 The EPA
interpretation also allows initial circuit court review of regulations pursuant to
section 509, because section 301 "promulgation" is explicitly covered therein.
Under this view, then, the Act provides a double-barreled anti-pollution
mechanism: regulation through promulgation of limitations, and additional
regulation through NPDES.
IV. THE JUDICIAL SOLUTION
A. The Eighth Circuit
The first court to consider these issues was the Eighth Circuit in CPC
International Inc. v. Train. 92 This is the only circuit which has upheld the
petitioners' construction of the Act. 93 The court's determination that section
301 did not grant the EPA regulatory authority turned upon what it felt to be
unambiguous passages in the legislative history94 and upon a rigid construc-
tion of the passive voice of section 301: "there shall be achieved ...effluent
limitations." 95 The Eighth Circuit pointed first to the existence in other
sections of the Act 96 of express provisions for the promulgation of national
standards as applied to other-than-existing point sources; specifically, new
sources and toxic discharges. 97 These active provisions were seen to differ
fundamentally (and intentionally) from the passivity of section 301 in several
aspects.
88. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 624 (2d Cir. 1976).
89. The Act § 301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
90. See, e.g., CPC Int'l Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1037 (8th Cir. 1975). See also American
Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1036 (3d Cir. 1975).
91. CPC Int'l Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1037 (8th Cir. 1975). See also American Petrol.
H, supra note 26, at 16; Du Pont 1, supra note 22, at 17.
92. 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975).
93. American Petrol. II, supra note 26, at 13.
94. CPC II, supra note 69, at 2 n.I.
95. The Act § 301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
96. 515 F.2d at 1038, citing the Act § 306(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(B) (Supp. V, 1975).
97. 515 F.2d at 1038, citing the Act §§ 306-07, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1316-17 (Supp. V, 1975).
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First, the word "standards," which took on special meaning because of the
purpose of the Act,98 was employed in these active sections. Second, these
standards were to be published specifically by regulation, enforced indepen-
dently of the permit system, 99 and promulgated according to a strict sched-
ule.100 Because these details were included in those sections of the Act which
did provide the EPA with national regulatory authority, their omission from
section 301 meant that the EPA could not promulgate effluent limitations
pursuant to that section. 10 '
That existing sources were to be treated differently from new sources did
not strike the court as anomalous: ample justification for this result was found
in a remark by Russell Train, respondent and EPA Administrator, to the
effect that "[a]cross-the-board requirements can be justified for new plants,
since they have many options in terms of processes, inputs, and the like,
which is not the case for existing facilities."'10 2
Finally, the lack of regulatory power under section 301 was driven home by
another "intentional omission" in the statutory language. The court pointed
out that there was a deadline for promulgation of guidelines under section
304, but no such deadline for section 301 requirements. It concluded that this
inconsistency would be "inexplicable" 10 3 unless Congress had intentionally
omitted any authority to regulate under section 301.
The court also rejected EPA's argument that permit issuance under section
402 was to be governed by regulations published pursuant to section 301.104
Instead, the court found clear evidence in the language of section 402(d)(2) 'Os
that permit issuance was to follow the effluent limitation guidelines promul-
gated under section 304(b).10 6 It was at this point that the court relied heavily
upon the legislative history.' 0 7 Of the commentaries cited, all made some
reference to either the "guidelines" or "permits" as the primary method of
enforcement. 108
98. That is, the Act itself is a method of implementation of regulations to improve the
national water standard. See note 74 supra.
99. 515 F.2d at 1038, citing the Act § 306(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1316b)(1)CB) (Supp. V, 1975).
100. 515 F.2d at 1038, citing the Act § 307, 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (Supp. V, 1975).
101. 515 F.2d at 1038.
102. Id. at 1038 n.13, quoting History, supra note 13, at 1115 (emphasis added).
103. 515 F.2d at 1039.
104. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
105. "No permit shall issue [if it is] outside the guidelines . . . of this chapter." The Act §
402(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) (Supp. V, 1975).
106. 515 F.2d at 1038.
107. Id. at 1039-42.
108. "'Effluent limitations ... would be established ... by means of the permits.. . ' "Id.
at 1039, quoting a letter to Chairman Blatnik of the House Public Work's Committee from EPA
Administrator Ruckelshaus (emphasis omitted). "'By 1976 each ... source should have ... a
permit setting forth the effluent limitations .... ' "Id. at 1040, quoting History, supra note 13, at
1463 (emphasis omitted). " '[S]ection [304] . . . guidelines [reflect] the mandate of § 301 ....
[T]hese guidelines would define the effluent limitations .... ' "Id., citing History, supra note 13,
at 1469 (emphasis omitted). "'EPA ... will set.., the uniform, national standards by way of
guidelines .... ' " Id. citing History, supra note 13, at 727 (emphasis omitted).
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Such authority was apparently deemed sufficient to support the court's
interpretation.10 9 Even so, it is doubtful that the Eighth Circuit would have
held in favor of the petitioner's view if it were not for the administrative
retention of veto power over the entire permit process. The administrative
veto, set out in section 402(c) i1 0 of the Act, was considered crucial to the
attainment of the national goal of elimination of discharge." 1 ' Any potential
problems of non-uniformity in enforcement were curable through administra-
tive veto of the permit. 2
The overall mechanism of the Act, as interpreted by the Eighth Circuit, is a
more substantial version of the petitioner's construction. Section 301 is the
basic national mandate.1 13 Under this section, all discharge of pollutants is
illegal except that which is permissible through application of the required
technology. Section 301 itself does not give the Administrator of the EPA the
power to promulgate nationally uniform regulations for existing sources.
Rather, to further the Act's ultimate aim, 114 while ensuring adequate state
participation and control,115  federally established effluent limitation
guidelines for existing sources are to be published and utilized at the permit
issuance stage. The guidelines are to reflect the maximum amount of dis-
charge reduction possible" 16 under the appropriate technology. In issuing
permits for industrial plants account is to be taken of peculiar factors that, in
extraordinary cases, will allow variance from the established guidelines. To
insure national uniformity and to avoid the evils of non-compliance which
plagued the pre-1972 programs,1 1 7 the Administrator has retained full veto
power over those permits and permit programs which he feels will impede
implementation of the Act. Though judicial review of section 304 guidelines
has not been specifically provided for in the statute, the circuit courts may
109. See id. at 1039.
110. "Any State permit program under this section shall at all times be in accordance with
this section and guidelines promulgated pursuant to section 1314(h)(2) of this title." The Act §
402(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(2) (Supp. V, 1975). "Whenever the Administrator determines...
that a State is not [so] administering a program.., he... shall withdraw approval of any such
program . . . ." The Act § 402(c)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (Supp. V, 1975).
111. The court's concern with the pivotal role of administrative veto power over permits Is
indicated by the fact that almost three pages of its opinion deals exclusively with this area. 515
F.2d at 1040-42. "It is in this light that [the section 402(d)(2)) proviso, that the Administrator may
veto permits which do not comply with the guidelines, takes on vital importance." Id. at 1041-42
(emphasis omitted).
112. See id. at 1042.
113. Id. at 1040, citing History, supra note 13, at 1469.
114. "Uniformity, finality, and enforceability." History, supra note 13, at 162 (remarks of
Sen. Muskie).
115. "It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution .... It is further
the policy of the Congress to ... provide Federal ... aid to State ... agencies ... in connection
with the prevention, reduction, and elimination of pollution." The Act § 101(b), 33 U.S.C. §
1251(b) (Supp. V, 1975). See 515 F.2d at 1039-43.
116. 515 F.2d at 1037-38 n.11, citing History, supra note 13, at 1468.
117. See note 74 supra.
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nevertheless review them through their authority to review action taken by
the EPA regarding issuance or veto of any permit.118
B. The Third and Seventh Circuits
Approximately six months later, the same issues were considered by the
Third Circuit, in American Iron & Steel Institute v. EPA, 11 9 and the Seventh
Circuit, in American Meat Institute v. EPA. 120 The opinions in each case
share approximately the same logical structure; however, as there are differ-
ent emphases, individual analysis is required.
In the Third Circuit, American Iron & Steel came to court armed with the
precedent1 21 set in the CPC case. 1 22 In fact, petitioners relied so heavily upon
the CPC holding that the Third Circuit's opinion, concluding that section 301
did in fact grant the EPA the power to promulgate effluent limitation
regulations independently of the permit process, 123 became little more than a
point-by-point refutation of the CPC position.12 4
The court agreed with CPC that no explicit language in section 301 granted
the Administrator "or anyone else" the power to promulgate effluent lim-
itations. 125 But relying on section 509(b)(1)(E), the court found these powers
to be implicitly authorized. That section provides judicial review of " 'the
Administrator's action . . . in approving or promulgating any effluent
limitation or other limitation under section 301 .... , ",126 Since the Act
allowed review of section 301 promulgation, obviously promulgation under
section 301 existed.12 7
Furthermore, section 509(b)(1)(E) listed review of section 402 permit pro-
ceedings separately from review of section 301 actions. To the Third Circuit
this distinction gave "effluent limitations" a significance independent of
"(permits."128
The Eighth Circuit had explained the section 301 reference in section
509(b)(1)(E) by pointing to section 301(c), a section which empowers the
Administrator to modify any of the requirements of section 301(b)(2)(A). 129
The Third Circuit stated that "modification," as used in this section, meant
"relaxation." Thus, because "relaxation" of requirements was not "promulga-
118. The Act § 509(b)(1)(D), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(D) (Supp. V, 1975).
119. 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975).
120. 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975).
121. See 526 F.2d 1027, 1037 (3d Cir. 1975).
122. Compare 526 F.2d 1027, 1036 (3d Cir. 1975) with notes 96-101 supra and accompanying
text.
123. 526 F.2d 1027, 1036-37 (3d Cir. 1975).
124. See, e.g., id. at 1037-42.
125. Id. at 1036.
126. Id. at 1037, quoting the Act § 509(b)(1)(E), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)tE) (Supp. V, 1975).
127. 526 F.2d at 1037.
128. Id.
129. 515 F.2d at 1043. See § 301(c) which states in part: "The Administrator may modify the
requirements of subsection (b)(2)(A) of this section. ... The Act § 301(c), 33 U.S.C. § 131 1(c)
(Supp. V, 1975); CPC Int'l Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1043 (8th Cir. 1975).
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tion,' 130 the mere authorization to relax the requirements of section 301
clearly could not be "within the scope of section [509 promulgation] . .. .,131
In addition, the Third Circuit found separate reference to sections 301 and
402 not only in section 509 but throughout the Act as well. 1 2 The court felt
that if the petitioner's view were correct, that is, if limitations could only be
set by the permit process, then only a reference to section 402 would have
been necessary. Such a construction would render the actual language of the
Act redundant, 133 and therefore would violate one of the cardinal rules of
statutory interpretation. 134 The Eighth Circuit had explained this redundancy
by finding that the reference to section 301 was actually a reference to section
301(f), 135  an absolute prohibition on discharge of radiological and
radioactive-type wastes. The Third Circuit's rejection of this reasoning, based
upon a flat declaration that a "prohibition" is not a "limitation, '1 3 6 consti-
tuted further justification for its conclusion that section 301 was itself the
fount of EPA regulatory authority.
137
Though the Third Circuit, like the Eighth, derived support for its position
from various parts of the Act's legislative history, 138 its final point was more
directly substantiated by recent Supreme Court cases on the scope of judicial
review of agency rule-making. The most recent of such decisions, Train v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 139 makes clear the proposition that
where an act of Congress is ambiguous and susceptible to a number of
constructions, the interpretation made of it by the appropriate administrative
agency should be given deference. Following this guideline, 140 the Third
Circuit in this instance found the EPA's interpretation to be correct and
therefore refrained from substituting its judgement for that of the Agency. ' 4 1
Despite the semantic quibbling, the American Iron & Steel decision, like
CPC, provides a fairly coherent picture of the mechanism of the Act. The
section 301 limitations represent the maximum level of permissible effluent
discharges. 142 According to the decision, this ceiling is to take into account the
130. 526 F.2d at 1037 & n.15.
131. Id. at 1037.
132. Id. at 1038-39.
133. 526 F.2d at 1038.
134. See 50 Am. Jur. Statutes § 359 (1944).
135. 515 F.2d at 1043. See the Act § 301(f), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(0 (Supp. V, 1975). "Notwith-
standing any other provisions of this chapter it shall be unlawful to discharge any radiological,
chemical, or biological warfare agent or high-level radioactive waste into the navigable waters."
Id.
136. 526 F.2d at 1038.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1039-45. " 'It is the Committee's intention that pursuant to subsection 301(b)(l)(A)
and Section 304(b) the Administrator will interpret the term "best practicable" when applied
to various categories of industries as a basis for specifying clear and precise effluent limitations
. . Id. at 1040, quoting History, supra note 13, at 1468 (emphasis omitted).
139. 421 U.S. 60 (1975). See 526 F.2d at 1041.
140. 526 F.2d at 1042.
141. Id. at 1047.
142. Id. at 1045.
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varying capabilities of point sources. Then, in an additional step, the Ad-
ministrator must promulgate guidelines for use by the permit issuer in
deciding whether more stringent limitations are to be imposed on individual
point sources. That is, "section 304 guidelines are intended to provide precise
guidance . . . in establishing a permissible level of discharge that is more
stringent than the ceiling. '143
The Sevenih Circuit, in deciding American Meat Institute v. EPA144
agreed with the Third Circuit. In so doing, however, the court focused on the
Supreme Court's standard of agency review-that the court need only find the
agency approach to be reasonable. 14 s Thus, when the Seventh Circuit found
several phrases in the Act referring to "effluent limitation ...under section
301,''146 its task was complete. The EPA position was held to be reason-
able. 147 This, of course, automatically gave the EPA authority to issue
effluent limitations under section 301, while conferring upon the circuit court
the authority to review the regulations under section 509(b)(1)(E).1 48
The court also implied an alternate basis for its decision. Under its
interpretation of CPC a practical anomaly results: judicial review of individ-
ual permits based upon nationally uniform limitations would be available in
the circuit courts, whereas review of the limitations themselves would be
reviewed in the district courts. 149 Such a result was seen to conflict with the
congressional intent (derived from the legislative history) to insure quick and
consistent application of national guidelines by providing direct review in the
courts of appeal. s° This conflict with congressional intent was the final proof
needed to sustain the EPA's interpretation.' 5 1 Even so, the court implied that
its position was one of expedience rather than a final resolution of the
interpretive difficulties, for it held the EPA view correct only " 'to the extent
that it can be said with complete assurance that any particular interpretation
of a complex statute such as this is the "correct" one.' ,,iS2
C. The Fourth and Tenth Circuits
The Fourth and Tenth Circuits were the next courts to consider the issues;
in each circuit the issues were broken down into two segments and decided
separately. In the Fourth Circuit, the cases were both entitled E. I. Du Pont
de Nemours & Co. v. Train'5 3 and in the Tenth Circuit, American Petroleum
Institute v. Train.'5 4
143. Id.
144. 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975).
145. Id. at 449-50. See notes 139-41 supra and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., the Act §§ 509(b)(1), 302(a), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1369(b)(1), 1312(a) (Supp. V, 197S).
147. 526 F.2d at 452.
148. Id.
149. Id., citing CPC Int'l Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1038 (8th Cir. 1975).
150. 526 F.2d at 452. See History, supra note 13, at 330-31, 822-23, 1502-03.
151. 526 F.2d at 452.
152. Id., quoting Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 87 (1975).
153. 528 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1662 (1976); Du Pont II, supra
note 22.
154. 526 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1975); American Petrol. II, supra note 26.
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The first case in each series considered only the jurisdictional question:
whether the circuit court had original jurisdiction to review the EPA action in
question.15 5 Both circuits answered this question in the affirmative. 156 In the
latter case in each series, the courts' resolutions of the substantive issues
represented somewhat of a turning point: they both refused to become
involved in a hair-splitting survey of legislative history. IS7 Such a pursuit was
considered futile, for each court quickly realized that "[s]upport [could] be had
for diametrically opposed conclusions."1 58 Instead, the courts concentrated on
an analysis of the language of the Act itself.
It should be noted at the outset that there exist surprising parallels between
the language and structure of the Fourth and Tenth Circuits' decisions. 15 9
The discussion that follows will therefore center on the Fourth Circuit case,
with the understanding that the Tenth Circuit is in complete accord.
155. This approach begs the question: it can be argued that circuit court jurisdiction,
pursuant to section 509, can be had only for review of section 301 and that, therefore, acceptance
of jurisdiction to review EPA action with regard to existing sources of pollution holds an Implicit
acceptance of EPA authority to regulate under § 301. Nevertheless, both circuits found the
distinction critical, for it enabled them to confer jurisdiction upon the circuit courts while
deferring the substantive issues for later determination.
For example, the Fourth Circuit concluded that it was "unnecessary to decide the substantive
question of authority to issue the regulations under § 301 alone in order to decide the question of
which federal court has jurisdiction to review them," E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,
528 F.2d 1136, 1141 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1662 (1976), while the Tenth Circuit
concluded that, for their purposes, the question of EPA authority to promulgate § 301 regulations
was "beside the point." American Petrol. Inst. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1343, 1345 (10th Cir. 1975).
Both decisions, finding that circuit court jurisdiction did exist, were explained in the following
way. The section (301 or 304) under which the regulations at issue were promulgated is Irrevelant.
Even if § 301 merely set out the Act's technological objectives (the Eighth Circuit's vIew), the §
304 guidelines must nevertheless be seen as the means to the § 301 ends. E. I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Train, 528 F.2d 1136, 1142 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1662
(1976); American Petrol. Inst. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1343, 1345 (10th Cir. 1975). Thus, any action
taken by the Administrator under § 304 is to be considered pursuant to § 301, and is therefore
reviewable by the circuit courts under § 509. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 528 F.2d
1136, 1142 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1662 (1976); American Petrol. Inst. v. Train,
526 F.2d 1343, 1345 (10th Cir. 1975).
156. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 528 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted,
96 S. Ct. 1662 (1976); American Petrol. Inst. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1975).
157. American Petrol. II, supra note 26, at 9-10; Du Pont I, supra note 22, at 13-14.
158. Du Pont II, supra note 22 at 13-14.
159. Judge Breitenstein, Senior Circuit Judge for the Tenth Circuit, was on the bench during
all four cases. A comparison of the language of the Du Pont II and American Petrol. UI cases is
interesting. For example, the sentence, "[pirimary enforcement of the Act is secured through the
permit system established by § 402," Du Pont II, supra note 22, at 6, is repeated verbatim In
American Petrol. I, supra note 26, at 4, without a citation to the former case. Or, compare
"[i]nherent in this dispute is the question of national uniformity versus state power and
responsibility," Du Pont II, supra note 22, at 17, with "[fln essence, the conflict concerns national
uniformity versus state power and responsibility," American Petrol. II, supra note 26, at 16.
Again, no cite to the former is given in the latter. Therefore, when the court in American Petrol.
II says "[w]e can do no more than the Fourth Circuit did in duPont I," id. at 17, the word "we"
invites curiosity. The reader is asked to draw his own conclusions.
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First, the Fourth Circuit found the EPA publications to be both "effluent
limitations" and "guidelines,"' 160 a permissible combination of sections 301
and 304 that was called for by the practical exigencies of the time. 16 1 Second,
though it recognized that section 301 said nothing about regulations (as
opposed to section 304, which did), it found the source of the power to impose
section 301 limitations in a section of the Act which had not been mentioned
by the other courts-section 501(a). 162 This section authorizes the Adminis-
trator " 'to prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out his
functions under this Act.' "163 The question of the extent of the Adminis-
trator's functions was resolved in the following way. The court noted that
section 301(e) provides for limitations 164 without indicating who has the
authority to promulgate them. Noting that the Act would be "unworkable"'' 65
unless someone had the necessary authority, the establishment of limitations
was held to be one of the Administrator's functions which he was authorized
to carry out by prescribing regulations.
Having reached this point, the court then considered the effect of the
regulations in light of their hybrid nature as both section 301 limitations and
section 304 guidelines.' 66 A position had to be adopted which resolved the
tension between the requirements of national uniformity and adequate leeway
for local variations 67 because, while petitioners urged that the regulations
were guidelines to be considered by the permit issuer, EPA argued that the
limitations were uniformly applicable throughout the nation, and thus binding
on the permit issuer. 168 Resolution of these conflicting positions would result
in a determination of whether limitations may be imposed on the basis of
industrial categories, or whether the limitations must be made on a plant-by-
plant basis. The court based its decision on practical administrative consid-
erations. 69 The regulations are presumed to be applicable to all permit
applications. 170 Thus, a balance is created which "assures all possible uni-
formity without sacrifice of the flexibility needed to adjust for disparate plants
.... "17 The regulatory process is initiated by promulgation of limitations on
160. American Petrol. I1, supra note 26, at 15; Du Pont U, supra note 22, at 13.
161. That is, the "court imposed timetable," Du Pont 1, supra note 22, at 7-8, 13, 16. It
might also be noted that if the court did not find the combination of these two steps permissible,
it probably would have had to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. See note 155 supra.
162. Du Pont I1, supra note 22, at 15; the Act § 501(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1361(a) (Supp. V. 1975).
163. Du Pont II, supra note 22, at 15.
164. The Act § 301(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(e) (Supp. V, 1975).
165. Du Pont II, supra note 22, at 15-16. "The Act is ineffective unless somebody fixes
effluent limitations." American Petrol. II, supra note 26, at 17.
166. See note 161 supra and accompanying text.
167. See notes 114 & 115 supra and accompanying text. The issue of federalism is itself
central to the Act's interpretation, and is beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion of this
and other constitutional difficulties inherent in the Act, see Smith, Highlights of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 77 Dick. L. Rev. 459, 461-67 (1973).
168. Du Pont H, supra note 22, at 17.
169. Id. at 21-23.




a subcategorical basis, and proper balance is achieved when "[problems
relating to specific factual situations are [determined] at the permit-issuing
stage. '172
D. The Second and District of Columbia Circuits
Within a period of two months both the Second and District of Columbia
Circuits 17 3 had opportunities to interpret the interaction of sections 301, 304,
402, and 509. Although the result in each case is similar to that reached in tile
Fourth and Tenth Circuits, the analysis employed is not.
The Second Circuit, drawing as it did upon a more substantial judicial
history than the others, showed hesitation in its decision. The court stated
that "[t]he jurisdiction question and its subsidiary issues admit of no easy
answer [for] [t]he Act states neither that effluent limitations are to be
promulgated in permits nor that they are to be promulgated independently by
regulations. 1 74 Consequently, the court's ultimate construction of the Act-
that section 304 structures the procedure and criteria to be utilized by the
Administrator in satisfying section 301's mandate of effluent limitations-was
neither based wholly upon interpretation of specific statutory language, nor
upon a final resolution of conflicting passages in the legislative history.
Instead, recognizing the conflict in the earlier cases, 175 the court began with
the simple observation that due to the "very magnitude" of the congressional
task the "problem of statutory interpretation was unavoidable .... ,1176 Thus,
the court felt no need for a comprehensive survey of the entire legislative
history, and concluded that a few "citations suffice to demonstrate that the
draftsmen . . . intended the promulgation of effluent limitations by regula-
tions apart from the permit-granting process.' 177
In support of the independence of the regulations from the permit process
the court cited legislative history passages which stated that the economic
impact of effluent limitations was not to be made on a plant-by-plant basis. 178
That the Act required a series of effluent limitation regulations also applicable
nationally to industrial categories and subcategories was seen to flow logically
from the same passages, 79 as was the view of section 301 as the source of
EPA authority to promulgate such regulations.' 80
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit' 8 ' apparently
approved the reasoning of the Second Circuit's decision and suggested as
well that the economic determination rationale demanded fuller explication.
172. Id. at 23.
173. American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Hooker Chems.
& Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1976).
174. 537 F.2d at 627.
175. Id. at 625-27.
176. Id. at 627.
177. Id. at 628.
178. Id., citing History, supra note 13, at 255.
179. Id. at 628.
180. See id.
181. American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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The District of Columbia Circuit gave a detailed analysis, 8 2 finding that
section 301 was the source of EPA regulatory authority because "a plant-by-
plant determination of the economic impact of an effluent limitation . . .
should be avoided.'18 3 In this light, section 301 was seen as the "fundamental
control section [which] contemplates national standards of effluent limitations
(rather than individual plant standards)."1' 8 4 Petitioner's argument, that lim-
itations are to be imposed individually through the permit process, was
rejected.' 85
V. EVALUATION
With the exception of the Eighth Circuit, all of the courts to consider the
issues have upheld the EPA position that it does have the power to issue
regulations under section 301.186 Yet in many cases the approach taken
remains unconvincing, particularly when contrasted with corresponding
points of the CPC opinion.
It will be recalled that the Eighth Circuit took a fairly rigid view of the
statutory language. Section 301 was not seen as the source of EPA regulatory
authority because, in direct contrast to other express provisions, it contained
no specific reference to the promulgation of national effluent limitations. 8
7 It
is submitted that this view finds further support in other statutory language.
For example, section 301(e) states that effluent limitations "shall be applied
in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.'8 8 The word chapter is a
direct reference to the entire Act, for section 301 itself is a small section of
subchapter ml, Standards and Enforcement. 8 9 The obvious implication is
that the power to regulate effluent discharge is external to section 301, for the
specific sections governing new and toxic sources are totally self-contained,
with express provision for the application of standards according to those
sections. 190 The result here also provides direct support for the CPC interpre-
tation of section 301 as the national mandate (the goal), rather than the
national authority (the means).
If one accepts this view of section 301 as a statement of the national goal,
the weaknesses of the Eighth Circuit decision as seen by the other courts all
but disappear. The Third Circuit had reasoned, for example, that because
section 509(b)(1)(E) explicitly refers to promulgation under section 301, dis-
tinct regulatory authority must exist under the latter section.' 9' While the
182. Id. at 114-23.
183. Id. at 122, citing History, supra note 13, at 255 (emphasis partially deleted).
184. Id. at 124.
185. Id. at 131.
186. American Petrol. II, supra note 26, at 13.
187. See notes 96-101 supra and accompanying text.
188. The Act § 301(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(e) (Supp. V, 1975) (emphasis added).
189. This contrasts with the heading of 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., "Chapter 26-Water
Pollution Prevention and Control [New]." 33 U.S.C. at 2697 (Supp. V, 1975).
190. The Act §§ 306(e), 307(d), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1316(e), 1317(d) (Supp. V, 1975). See notes
97-101 supra and accompanying text.
191. See notes 126-28 supra and accompanying text.
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Eighth Circuit had explained the reference in section 509(b)(1)(E) to section
301 by pointing to section 301(c), a modification provision, 192 the Third
Circuit felt compelled to disagree. The latter drew a distinction between
relaxation and promulgation. 193 However, this distinction does not withstand
closer scrutiny. If, as its title clearly indicates, 194 section 301(b) requires the
setting of a schedule of compliance (i.e., the goal), surely the act of setting
time limitations on the achievement of certain levels of effluent discharge is
itself promulgation. Any modification thereof, to the extent that it represents
a new, replacement mandate, would therefore also be a promulgation.
The Third Circuit had also concentrated on those portions of the Act
which, had petitioner's interpretation of them been accepted, would have
been rendered redundant. Because section 301 had been mentioned in several
places in the Act as a separate provision, the court was able to give this
section its own regulatory significance. 19s The court pointed specifically to
section 505 which provides for direct suit by citizens against a violator of any
administrative limitation set according to, among others, sections 301 and 402
(permits).196 The Eighth Circuit, relying on section 301(f), which prohibits the
discharge of radiological and radioactive wastes, 197 found no inherent redun-
dancy. The Third Circuit also distinguished a prohibition from a limita-
tion. 198 This distinction is less than compelling. It must be realized that if a
point source were discharging radioactive wastes, it could hardly be doing so
in violation of section 402, since a permit would never be granted allowing
such discharge in the first place. Therefore, if separate provision for citizen
enforcement of the section 301(f) prohibition were not made, it is possible that
a citizen suit would be precluded-a result directly inconsistent with one of
the Act's major underlying policies. 199 Certainly, small redundancies are
preferable to large paradoxes.
The Third Circuit opinion is fundamentally inconsistent in more ways than
one. For example, the court concluded that section 301 requires the imposi-
tion of limitations which establish the maximum level of permissible effluent
discharge. 20 0 Then, section 304 guidelines are to be utilized by the permit
issuer in deciding whether more stringent limitations are to be imposed on
individual point sources. 20 1 Although on its face the interpretation seems
sensible, it is submitted that the reasoning is backwards.
192. See note 129 supra and accompanying text.
193. See notes 130-31 supra and accompanying text.
194. "Timetable for achievement of objectives," 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
"Modification of timetable," 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c) (Supp. V, 1975).
195. See notes 132-37 supra and accompanying text.
196. See note 132 supra and accompanying text.
197. See note 135 supra and accompanying text.
198. See note 136 supra and accompanying text.
199. "Public participation in the . . . enforcement of any regulation, standard, effluent
limitation, plan, or program established. . . under this chapter shall be provided for, encouraged,
and assisted by the Administrator and the States." The Act § 101(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (Supp.
V, 1975).




First, the express language of section 301 must be examined. 262 It is clear
that because section 301 makes no mention of the determination of effluent
limitations without making reference to section 304, any action taken pur-
suant to section 301 with regard to the setting of limitations must follow the
requirements of section 304.203 Second, it must be emphasized that section
304 speaks only of that degree of effluent discharge attainable through
application of the best available technology. 20 4 These represent the most
stringent applicable limitations. The next step, provided in sections 304
(b)(1)(B) and (b)(2)(B), is the specification of those factors to be taken into
account when considering which individual point sources within a given
category will be allowed to deviate from the best attainable level of dis-
charge. 205 This refers to the application of less stringent standards to those
point sources whose individual characteristics require such variance. There-
fore, the Third Circuit interpretation of section 301 effluent limitations as the
maximum permissible discharge level within a given category (or, that section
301 represents the base level of allowable effluent control) is clearly erroneous,
as is the court's interpretation of the function of the permit process as the
application of more stringent standards to those point sources which seem to
require it.
Furthermore, the Act and its history are replete with manifestations of a
desire to set strict standards and allow deviations only where absolutely
necessary..20 6 This is expressly stated in section 101 and reflected in section
304. The national goal is the absolute cessation of discharge.2 0 7 The Act does
not state, as the Third Circuit would insist, that the national goal is a
permissible level of discharge that in certain circumstances will be made more
stringent.
The Seventh Circuit approach avoided the pitfalls surrounding the Third
Circuit's decision. In fact, the issues which concerned the court in the Third
Circuit received summary attention in the Seventh. The latter court felt itself
compelled to " 'uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path
202. E.g., "there shall be achieved ... effluent limitations for point sources ... which shall
require the application of the best practicable control technology . . . as defined by the
Administrator pursuant to section 1314(b) .... The Act § 301(b)(1(A), 33 U.S.C. § 131 ltb)ll)(A)
(Supp. V, 1975).
203. See notes 39-52 supra and accompanying text.
204. "[T]he best practicable control technology currently available .... ".The Act §
304(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(A) (Supp. V, 1975). "[Tihe best control measures and
practices achievable. ... The Act § 304(b)(2)A), 33 U.S.C. § 1314tb)[2)tA) tSupp V. 1975)
205. E.g., "specify factors to be taken into account in determining the best measures and
practices available... to be applicable to any point source... within such categories or classes."
The Act § 304(b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B) (Supp. V, 1975).
206. "Clean water means the elimination of the discharge of pollutants .... Only when
technology is not available to achieve such a goal will exceptions be made and even then
exceptions will not be made if the quality of the receiving body of water would be impaired
beyond a level acceptable to public health and recreation standards." History, supra note 13, at
1278 (remarks of Sen. Montoya). See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
207. The Act § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(I) (Supp. V. 1975)
1976]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
may reasonably be discerned.' "o208 This result was viewed as required by the
rule of Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc . 20 9
However, the mere acknowledgement of the rationality of the EPA's
interpretation ignores the strengths of the opposing side, as almost any
approach can be deemed reasonable. Natural Resources does not mandate the
acceptance of the EPA's interpretation. If the court feels that the EPA action
is either not in accordance with law210 or "in excess of statutory ... authority
... or short of statutory right,"12 1' it could overturn the agency's position. It is
also clear that the Eighth Circuit's view of section 301 as the national
mandate automatically renders the EPA's promulgation under that section "in
excess of statutory . . . authority. '2 12
The Second Circuit approach is also unsatisfactory because the particular
legislative history upon which the court relied can easily support the opposite
conclusion. Furthermore, the passages relied on by the court are irrelevant to
the issues it had to decide. Thus, the legislative commentary which forms the
foundation of the Second Circuit decision, also relied on by the District of
Columbia Circuit, to the effect that the economic impact of effluent limita-
tions is not to be made upon a plant-by-plant basis, 21 3 is not decisive of the
present issues, especially when one considers that the Act's ultimate goal is the
elimination of pollution "without regard to cost."'2 14 More importantly, the
conclusion drawn from such statements, that section 301 demands application
of uniform effluent limitations on a categorical basis, without regard to cost,
conflicts directly with section 304 which specifically includes cost as a factor
to be considered in applying guidelines to individual point sources. 2 -1
Further, the only references to effluent limitations in section 301 includes
specific reference to section 304. 2 16 The court's reasoning, therefore, in-
creases, rather than tempers, the tension between sections 301 and 304.
Once again, the problems raised here can be eliminated by viewing section
301 as a statement of objectives--that "there shall be achieved . . . effluent
limitations. ' 21 7 Objectives are distinct from implementation. The conclusion
is virtually inescapable that the uniform achievement of effluent limitations
on a categorical basis, without regard to cost, is but a reflection of the
ultimate aim and not a method of implementation. This construction is
buttressed by the paradoxical results of the Second and District of Columbia
208. American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 453 (7th Cir. 1975), quoting Bowman
Transp. Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974).
209. 421 U.S. 60 (1975); see notes 139-41 supra and accompanying text.
210. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
211. 5 U.S.C § 706(2)(C) (1970).
212. Id. If § 301 is a timetable only, and not the source of EPA regulatory authority,
subsequent EPA promulgation of regulations under that section is clearly not within the scope of
its statutory authority.
213. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 628 (2d Cir. 1976).
214. History, supra note 13, at 170 (emphasis added).
215. The Act § 304(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (Supp. V, 1975).
216. The Act §§ 301(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A) (Supp. V, 1975),
217. The Act § 301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
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Circuits' opinions. For example, section 304 specifies cost as one of the factors
to be considered in allowing individual variances.2 18 This obviously refers to
the implementation of individual variances at permit issuance, for individual
characteristics could not possibly be taken into account on a categorical
basis.2 19 Yet, this is precisely what the language of the courts' opinions
implies.
Other problems arise with the District of Columbia Circuit's position. The
cornerstone of the court's argument is the statement in the conference report
noting that "[t]he conferees intend that the Administrator or the State, as the
case may be, will make the determination on the basis ... of classes ....
From this statement the court concluded that section 301 required the pro-
mulgation of effluent limitations applicable categorically. 221 However, re-
liance upon this same statement leads to a bizarre result. The states are able
to regulate only by issuing individual permits which must follow the require-
ments of section 301222 which are in turn defined by section 304.223 Combin-
ing the conference report with the District of Columbia Circuit decision, the
following results: (1) section 301 effluent limitations are set on a categorical
basis; (2) state permit programs, also in compliance with section 301 are set on
a categorical basis; (3) though section 304 (individual factors) provides the
substantive basis for section 301, the fact that section 301 must be applied
categorically means that section 304 will be ignored. Such illogic is scarcely
desirable.
Undue reliance upon legislative history led the court to applications incon-
sistent with the holdings of courts with which they are in apparent agreement.
For example, the District of Columbia Circuit asserted that, "[ilt is important
to remember . . . that § 301 is the basic enforcement mechanism relied upon
by Congress . *... ,224 This contrasts with the Fourth Circuit's holding that
"[p]rimary enforcement of the Act is secured through the permit system
established by § 402. "1225 It is important to point out that this inconsistency
exists even though the District of Columbia and Fourth Circuits have both
upheld the EPA's interpretation of section 301.
The lengths to which the courts have gone to support the authority of the
EPA in issuing regulations pursuant to section 301, coupled with the myriad
incbnsistencies which follow, forces one to question the validity of the
attempts in the first place. With this idea in mind, the Fourth and Tenth
Circuit cases seem, at least, refreshing. Gone are both the semantic hair-
218. See the Act § 304(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)ll)(B) (Supp. V. 1975).
219. This follows because the factors here are considered on an individual point source basis,
which occurs at the permit stage. The Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. V, 1975)
220. American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1976), citing
History, supra note 13, at 254.
221. 539 F.2d at 124.
222. The Act, § 402(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(A) (Supp. V, 1975).
223. See note 216 supra and accompanying text.
224. 539 F.2d at 127.
225. Du Pont II, supra note 22 at 6.
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splitting utilized by the Third Circuit and the inordinate reliance on legislative
history exhibited by the Second and District of Columbia Circuits. Instead,
the Fourth and Tenth Circuits were able to remain relatively free of logical
inconsistencies by using the "intent of Congress to improve and preserve the
quality of the Nation's waters" as the "guiding star" which illuminates "[ajll
issues. ' 226 The courts' approach is as effective as it is poetic. By realizing that
the Act would be "unworkable" without someone issuing regulations, the
courts easily established section 301 as the source of EPA regulatory author-
ity. 227 And, more importantly, a realization of the practical union of section
304 and 301 resolves both the jurisdictional question and the trade-off
between necessary local variation and national uniformity.
One problem remains. The Eighth Circuit has recently declined to abandon
its position as the sole member of the minority. 228 Though noting the
vehemence of the other circuits' rejection of CPC, the court held firm. In a
footnote to its latest opinion on the subject, CPC International Inc. v.
Train, 229 the court stated: "The District of Columbia Circuit suggests that we
'failed to see the forest for the trees'. We deny faulty vision. '230
The dissimilarity of interpretation among-the circuits is readily apparent.
Not so obvious, however, is that the practical differences stemming from
these widely disparate views are relatively minor. In most cases, the lim-
itations written into the permits for individual point sources should be quite
similar. In most cases, the balance of national uniformity and limitation
finality on the one side with the retention of state responsibility on the other
has been left intact. The only real difference is that section 304(b) guidelines
for existing sources would be susceptible to initial judicial review at the
district court level under the CPC view, and at the circuit court level under
every other view. Most of the circuits see this as an anomalous result, since it
is both contrary to the congressional intent to provide expeditious judicial
review2 3' and a waste of judicial resource. 232
But is this "anomaly" so objectionable? It is clear that no matter which
interpretation is followed, the burden on all courts, both district and circuit,
will be extremely heavy. Because the Act requires both a permit for every
individual discharger within a category 233 and separate guidelines/limitations
for every category, 234 several consequences are inevitable. First, every cate-
gory will bring an industry-wide challenge of the effluent limitations. This, as
226. American Petrol. II, supra note 26, at 10.
227. See note 164 supra and accompanying text.
228. CPC II, supra note 69.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 2 n.1, citing American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107, 129 n.5 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
231. See, e.g., CPC II, supra note 69, at 2-3 n.1; American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539
F.2d 107, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1976); American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 452 (7th Cir. 1975).
232. See, e.g., CPC II, supra note 69, at 4 n.1; American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539
F.2d 107, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1976); American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 452 (7th Cir. 1975).
233. The Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. V, 1975).
234. The Act §§ 301, 304, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1314 (Supp. V, 1975).
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we have seen, has already occurred. 235 Then, every individual discharger will
challenge his own permit, a result which also has occurred.2 3 6 Coupled with
the citizen suit provision which allows action by just about any interested
party, 237 the volume of litigation is potentially enormous. It seems reasonable
that under the CPC view, which does not provide original circuit court
jurisdiction, dischargers and others would be more likely to litigate in one
action-in a challenge of the permit which contains both limitations and
guidelines-when the point source itself is affected by the regulations. By
allowing two types of dilatory judicial challenges238 in the circuit courts, the
other circuits may be opening the doors to double trouble. It is this result
which is more truly a waste of judicial resource.
VI. CONCLUSION
The controversy continues. Though there are signs that the nation's waters
are on the road to recovery, 239 the existence of contrary indications24 0 renders
the question of the Act's meaning one of more than academic importance.
Yet, the courts' struggles in this area highlight a concern more fundamental
than the application of a single statutory scheme.
The Eighth Circuit touched upon the problem when it declared: "We
cannot disregard the intention of Congress and rewrite the statute simply
because of the practical problem of initially reviewing two closely related sets
of regulations at two different levels in the judicial system.12 41 Nevertheless,
the extent to which the other circuits felt compelled to, in essence, legislate
because of this perceived practical anomaly2 2 is apparent in the wide
dissimilarity of their approaches. 24 3
235. See notes 69 & 80 supra and accompanying text.
236. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Review of the House Comm. on
Public Works and Transportation, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1975).
237. See Sun Enterprises, Ltd. v. Train, 532 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1976). There, a corporation
downstream and a fishing and hunting club in the area of the permit-authorized discharger
brought suit challenging the issues permit. Similar actions are likely to be brought in the future.
238. The Act §§ 509(b)(1)(E), (b)(1)(F), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1369(b)l1)(E), (hb)1)lF) (Supp. V, 1975).
239. The Sixth Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality 362 (1975).
240. See, e.g., Libman, Troubled Waters, The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 8, 1976, at 42, col.
1; Bray, Kepone and The Toxic Control Bill, The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 29, 1976, at 24, col.
4; The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 1, 1976, at 6, col. 1.
241. CPC II, supra note 69 at 4 n.1.
242. Importantly, the effect of this so-called anomaly is by no means clear Notes 231-38
supra and accompanying text. Therefore, the effort of the courts to avoid what may be, in
practical terms, an illusory obstacle, becomes even more questionable.
243. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1074 (3d Cir. 1975) (Adams, J.,
concurring): "[Tlhe difficulty in interpretation impinges on the powers of the coordinate branches
of government within the federal system. Ours is a cooperative federalism in which the states and
the national government share responsibilities for many programs. The definition of the roles of
the state and national governments in areas where they share concurrent powers is essentially a
matter for Congress, not for the courts. The failure to create clear boundaries for the authority of
the states and the EPA has thrust upon the courts a responsibility to infer legislative intent from
the disparate provisions of this complex legislation. The courts have not evaded their responsibil-
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Judicial exercise of legislative functions may well be compelled by the
ambiguity of the Act itself. But, less obvious is the additional effect of the
doctrine illustrated in Natural Resources Defense Council. Giving agency
interpretations of complex and ambiguous statutes such a high degree of
deference increases the probability that statutory nuances will be overlooked.
The result, as here, is confusion. Somewhere, a definitive line must be drawn.
The recent grant of certiorari in the two Du Pont244 cases may lead to a
final resolution of these fundamental issues. Due to the straightforward
approach bf the Fourth Circuit, and the effectiveness of its solution, these
cases probably will be affirmed. Still, it is to be hoped that the Eighth
Circuit's attempt to do justice to all of the Act's language will be given due
consideration.
Randall H. Jensen
ity, but our disagreement with the Eighth Circuit underlines the extent to which the courts can
write law, even in areas of Congressional authority, when there has been a failure to manifest
legislative intent by clear statutory commands." Id. (footnote omitted).
244. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
